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: ESA 
: Phytoplankton bloom off the coast of Scotland 
: 16/05/2008 11:11 am – : 234528 
: This Envisat image captures the green swirls of a 
phytoplankton bloom in the North Sea off the coast of eastern Scotland. 
The chlorophyll phytoplankton collectively contain colour the ocean's 
waters, which provides a means of detecting these tiny organisms from 
space with dedicated ocean colour sensors, like Envisat's Medium 
Resolution Imaging Spectrometer (MERIS) instrument. MERIS acquired 
this image on 7 May 2008, working in Full Resolution mode to provide a 
spatial resolution of 300 m.  
Executive Summary 
This politically neutral work explores the impact of independence on 
Scotland’s emerging, innovative and world leading civilian space sector. 
The ecosystem is explained and quantified, clarifying the distinction 
between the European Space Agency (ESA) and the European Union, 
which the White Paper, Scotland’s Future, has blurred. 
Aspects of the White Paper relating to the sector are highlighted and 
discussed. The proposed relationship between an independent  Scotland 
(iScotland) and the UK Space Agency (UKSA) is unclear within the White 
Paper. As the spirit adopted in the White Paper is wherever possible to 
continue co-operation with existing UK bodies this scenario is considered, 
with membership of ESA via UKSA, alongside direct membership of ESA. 
Scottish independence could be said to be worth £15 – 20 million per 
year to the sector in the medium-term, and the long-term size and scale 
of the sector may be of order £100 million; almost triple the current size. 
However, this is dependent on the relationship established between 
iScotland and the rest-of-the-UK (rUK), and appears to require a 
contravention of the spirit of the White Paper. 
How iScotland chooses to maintain a formal relationship with UKSA is  
thus of vital importance, having both economic and legal implications. 
Seeking a continuing relationship would require agreement about 
delegation of ministerial power, sovereign funds and indemnity provisions 
in response to any government liability for damage. 
As regards membership of ESA and EUMETSAT in particular, the existing 
member states are required to agree to accession by iScotland and  
to set the conditions; any disruption or lack of access to international 
organisations, including the EU, could be a potentially significant problem. 
Post-independence, the scope of UK nationality, as opposed to 
citizenship, would also require clarification in the context of space and 
any on-going relationship with UKSA. 
The relationship with EUMETSAT via co-funding contributions to the Met 
Office requires further thought but does appear in principle to be a 
viable option. The same judgement of ‘viable’ can be reached when 
considering the Scottish government’s proposals around the Research 
Councils. However, whilst an approach may be viable, no assessment 
or judgement is offered as to its desirability from either an iScottish or 
rUK perspective.  

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: ESA/VITO 
: Springtime in Europe 
: 04/06/2014 4:49 pm – : 312289 
: This image of Europe is a composite of Proba-V images 
from 1–10 May 2014. Launched just over a year ago, the washing 
machine-sized satellite carries the Vegetation imager designed after  
the French Spot-Vegetation mission, flown on the Spot-4 and Spot-5 
satellites. Spot-Vegetation marked 16 years of service in May, and has 
now passed the torch to its European counterpart. Proba-V maps land 
cover and vegetation growth across the entire planet every two days. 
The data can also be used for day-by-day tracking of extreme weather, 
alerting authorities to crop failures, monitoring inland water resources 
and tracing the steady spread of deserts and deforestation. 
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Impact Assessment of Scottish Independence on the Space Sector 
 
 
In September, Scotland will decide 
whether to become again a nation 
state, or whether to continue with the 
Treaty of Union. Such a decision must 
be about the type of nation we are, 
that we aspire to be, and how that is 
best to achieved. The scale of the 
decision is immense and so it must be 
an informed one, based not on any 
single issue but rather on the balance 
of the evidence. As a contribution to 
this balance of evidence, this politically 
neutral work explores the impact of 
independence on Scotland’s emerging, 
innovative and world leading civilian 
space sector. 
Humanity has dreamt of travel beyond 
our cradle and into space since, at 
least, the time of the Roman conquest 
of Greece. From then, through Jules 
Verne’s inspirational novel De la Terre 
à la Lune
i
 and onto the modern-day, 
humanity’s travels beyond our Earth 
have been told in many a fanciful tale.  
To this day space technology maintains 
a mystique that most other forms of 
engineering struggle to emulate, and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
 Published in English as From Earth to the Moon. 
that none have managed to maintain 
quite so well. But, do not be blinded by 
the glamour, this is no witchcraft. Space 
technology offers unique opportunities 
in science, technology and commerce. 
In 2006/07, UK space revenues were 
£6.6 billion. By 2010/11, these revenues 
had grown to £9.1 billion, sustaining a 
decade-long growth trend with a near 
9% per annum growth in real-terms 
over that period.
ii
 
1. Definition of ‘the  
Space Sector’ 
The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) 
define the space sector as including “all 
public and private actors involved in the 
provision of space-enabled products 
and services.”
 iii
  This definition is widely 
accepted and used within Europe, with 
the sector sub-divided into the upstream 
and downstream. Broadly speaking, 
upstream categorises the research, 
engineering and technology providers  
of spacecraft and their operations, whilst 
downstream categorises the exploitation 
 
ii
 2010/11 is the base year for the UK’s national, 
industry-led 2014 Space Innovation and Growth 
Action Plan [1] using figures from the UK space ‘Size 
and Health’ survey [2], a biennial activity; the 2014 
‘Size and Health’ survey launched on 6 May 2014. 
iii
 See 
http://www.oecd.org/futures/space/thecommerci
alisationofspaceandthedevelopmentofspaceinfras
tructure.htm, cited 17 June 2014. 
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of this technology such as a satellite 
broadcast service or a Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) 
service provider, including the 
technology required to do so. 
Categorisation as upstream, 
downstream or out-of-scope 
can appear based on imprecise 
boundaries that are best explained 
by means of an example: the 
development of instruments for use 
in space-based astronomy such as  
the MIRI (Mid InfraRed Instrument) 
developed by the UK Astronomy 
Technology Centre (UK-ATC) in 
Edinburgh for the James Webb Space 
Telescope is upstream. Meanwhile, the 
exploitation of the data from MIRI is 
downstream, and ground-based 
astronomy such as the work of UK-ATC 
on the European Extremely Large 
Telescope is out-of-scope. 
2. Assumptions 
In order to make any assessment of the 
impact of independence, a number of 
assumptions are required. 
• In the 2011 census, the UK’s 
population was 63 181 775 while 
Scotland’s was 5 313 600, or 
8.41% of the UK total. Hence, 
when discussing population  
pro rata share, a population  
split of 8.41% shall be used. 
 
 
 
• The current maritime border, 
established following the median 
line principles of delimitation of 
territorial sea between adjacent 
states and the further criteria 
used within the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) is assumed;
iv
 
giving a Scottish GDP in 2011-12 
of £150.8 billion,
v
 or 9.6% of the 
UK’s GDP. Hence, when discussing 
GDP pro rata share, a GDP split 
of 9.6% shall be used. 
• It will be assumed that an 
independent Scotland (iScotland) 
is a member of the European 
Union and the European Space 
Agency, and that contribution 
levels to each will be in line with 
current, or planned pro rata 
levels. Sensitivity to this assumption 
is addressed in Section 5.9. 
3. The Space Sector Today  
The space sector ecosystem can appear 
complicated, even to those within the 
sector, however UK-wide the largest 
customer group is the commercial 
sector, accounting for 85% of total 
turnover (23 % business-to-business; 62% 
business-to-consumer), while the military, 
space agencies and civil government 
represent 7%, 5% and 3% respectively 
[2]. The dominance of business-to-
 
iv
 See UNCLOS, Part II, Article 15, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreeme
nts/convention_overview_convention.htm,  
cited 04 July 2014 
v
 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-
22134809, cited 11 June 2014 
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consumer in total sector turnover distorts 
analysis of both the research and 
development (R&D) spend within the 
sector and customer location analysis. 
However, both are critical, as the sector  
is export and R&D intensive. Total 
upstream R&D activity equated to 5.2% 
of turnover in 2010/11; by comparison  
the ‘Aerospace and Defence’ sector 
invested 3.5% of turnover in R&D, 
making the upstream sector 50% more 
R&D intensive [2]. 
With a multiplier impact of 1.99 the space 
sector made a value-added contribution 
to UK GDP of £8.2 billion in 2010/11,
vi
 and 
with an employment multiplier of 3.50 
supported the employment of over one-
hundred thousand people [2]. The 
industry is dominated by the downstream 
sector, accounting for almost £8.2 billion 
(89%) of total revenues, and 88% of the 
value-added contribution [2]. 
3.1. International 
The space sector, perhaps more than 
any other sector of the economy, is 
international. Indeed international co-
operation is often a pre-requisite. The 
most significant example of this for the UK 
space sector is the European Space 
Agency (ESA),
vii
 established in 1975 and 
headquartered in Paris, it is a twenty 
member-state intergovernmental 
 
 
 
 
 
vi
 Value-added is defined as turnover less  
all input costs. 
vii
 see http://www.esa.int/  
organisation dedicated to the 
exploration of space.
viii
 ESA was 
founded by, and is operated through 
intergovernmental treaties. Based on its 
governing Convention this includes 
cooperation with third states, notably 
Canada, which also sit on its Council. 
Four other states participate in the Plan 
for European Cooperating States (PECS),
ix
 
while other countries are in negotiation 
with ESA about joining this initiative. As an 
international organisation, entirely 
separate to the European Union, its 
operations benefits from international 
immunity. Note however that the links 
between ESA and the EU are complex, 
with various agreements in place that 
enable EU funded programmes to be 
administrated by ESA. 
ESA is funded by subscriptions to the 
mandatory and optional programmes. 
Funding to the mandatory programme is 
defined as a function of each member 
state’s GDP. ESA then encourages 
members to subscribe to optional 
programmes in proportion to their GDP. 
Hence, if a member’s contribution to the 
mandatory programme based on GDP is 
15%, ESA encourages them to subscribe 
to any optional programmes at around 
15% of that programme; however, 
unless all member states subscribe to 
the programme it is clear the level must 
be varied. In 2012-13, the UK’s 
 
viii
 ESA member states are Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
ix
 Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia. 
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contribution to ESA was reported by ESA 
as 240 million.
x
 Within this paper, the UK’s 
2012-13 contribution to ESA shall be 
assumed as £190 million,
xi
 however it 
should be noted that in November 2012 
the UK government committed to an 
average contribution of £240 million 
for the next five years. Scotland’s 
contribution was thus £18.2 million in 
2012/13 (based on a GDP pro rata of 
9.6%), rising to an average of £23 million 
each year post-2012/13. 
Another significant intergovernmental 
organisation that is separate from the 
European Union is EUMETSAT (European 
Organisation for the Exploitation of 
Meteorological Satellites),
xii
 created 
through an international convention 
agreed by thirty European member 
states.
xiii
 EUMETSAT commissions, 
maintains and exploits Europe’s 
meteorological satellites and is funded 
as a fixed percentage of member states 
gross national income. The UK is the 
second largest contributor to EUMETSAT, 
contributing 15.6% of the approximately 
90 million 2013 budget, equating to a 
contribution of around £11 million 
through the Met Office. Scotland’s 
 
x
 Note that the UK Space Agency accounts 
recorded an international expenditure of £190.5 
million that it noted as “mainly ESA” [3]. 
xi
 This gives a conversion rate of £1 =  1.26 that  
will be used throughout this paper. 
xii
 see http://www.eumetsat.int/  
xiii
 EUMETSAT member states are Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, and the United Kingdom. 
contribution, on a population pro rata, is 
thus £0.94 million. However, noting that 
the White Paper Scotland’s Future asserts 
that Scotland’s gross national income per 
head is approximately 8 % higher than 
the UK’s as a whole[4],  the level due 
from iScotland would be around £1.02 
million. 
The European Commission also fund 
R&D within the space sector; this funding 
is part of the 70 billion Horizon 2020 
programme, of which 119.5 million was 
allocated to space in 2014. This funding 
comes from member state contributions 
to the overall EU budget. 
Much of the legal framework that 
governs actions in space was 
developed, and is maintained by, the 
United Nations.
xiv
 This framework defines 
the roles and responsibilities of nation 
states. Signatories to these conventions 
typically reflect obligations within 
national legislation. Various states, 
including the UK and Sweden, 
introduced national space legislation in 
the nineteen-eighties. More recently, in 
the first decade of this millennium, an 
increasing number of states, including 
France, as Europe’s prime launching 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiv
 Including the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1968 
Rescue Agreement, the 1972 Liability Convention 
and the 1975 Registration Convention; discussed 
further in Section 5.4. 
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state with capabilities in the French 
départment, Guyane, South America, as 
well as Austria, have joined this effort with 
their national space statutes. An 
increasing number of states, including 
those in the European Union are moving 
towards introducing national space 
legislation, notably with a view to 
regulating the growing nano-spacecraft 
sector, including CubeSats,
xv
 which has 
emerged from the academic research 
community [5].
xvi
 
3.2. UK 
Within the UK, the Outer Space Act 1986 
(OSA) is the legal basis for regulating 
activities in outer space, including the 
launch and operation of space objects. 
Sections 3 and 4 of the Act confer 
licensing and other powers on the 
Secretary of State acting through the UK 
Space Agency. The role of the Secretary 
of State therefore ranges from controlling 
the activities of space operators under a 
UK license to carrying out inspection of 
licensee’s facilities, and to the provision of 
any information the Secretary of State 
considers fit (Section 5).  
The OSA prescribes that operators insure 
against liability incurred in respect of 
damage or loss suffered by third parties 
(Section 5 (2)f). Currently the level of 
insurance required is 60 million for a 
 
xv
 CubeSats are a standardised spacecraft form, 
with base unit of a 10 cm cube, which exploit 
simplicity, standardisation and conformity to drive 
down cost; see [5].  
xvi
 See 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/SpaceLa
w/national/state-index.html, cited 8 June 2014 
standard launch/payload, which is 
consistent with the level required under 
French and other European legislation, 
along with the practise of many other 
regulatory authorities [6 Ch. 23]. The OSA 
also passes on unlimited liability to the 
licensee against any claims brought 
against the government (Section 10). 
However, the government has begun the 
process required to give the Secretary of 
State the power to set or vary this liability 
limit with a cap of 60 million envisaged 
for the majority of missions, with further 
concessions under consideration for 
certain classes of nano- and micro-
spacecraft [7]. The government would 
therefore meet any losses beyond the 
liability cap. 
A multifaceted research and 
development funding ecosystem is 
employed. Broadly speaking the 
Research Councils are responsible for 
fundamental research (Technology 
Readiness Levels 1 – 4), and the 
Technology Strategy Board (TSB) and 
Satellite Applications Catapult (SAC) are 
responsible for applied research and 
pre-commercial development 
(Technology Readiness Levels 4 – 6).
xvii
  
The UK Space Agency (UKSA) is an 
executive agency of the Department 
for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) 
 
 
 
 
xvii
 Technology Readiness Levels are used to assess 
and define the maturity of a technology concept, 
ranging from a low readiness level of one to a 
mature ‘actual’ system with a readiness of nine; see 
page 33 of Ref. 6 for more information. 
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with responsibility for government 
policy; it also represents the UK in all 
international negotiations on space 
matters.  
The Natural Environment Research 
Council (NERC) and the Science & 
Technology Facilities Council (STFC) 
operate a “dual key” partnership with 
UKSA whereby they work with UKSA to 
develop and agree science priorities. 
The dual key mechanism can 
generally be understood as UKSA fund 
the upstream and flight activities, 
including ESA subscriptions, while the 
research councils fund the down-
stream, exploitation activities, 
studentships/fellowships, and non-
mission specific fundamental R&D.  
It must be noted that, in apparent 
contradiction to their official remit, the 
Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC) do not, in 
effect, fund any research within the 
space sector. 
The TSB is the UK's innovation agency, 
operating at arm's length from the 
government as a public body reporting 
to BIS. The TSB’s aim is “to accelerate 
economic growth by stimulating and 
supporting business-led innovation.”
xviii
 
One of the TSBs priority areas is “Space: 
Supporting innovative developments 
using satellite data and space-based 
satellite systems.”
xix
 The TSB have a service 
 
xviii
 From https://www.innovateuk.org/about-us,  
cited 20 May 2014 
xix
 From https://www.innovateuk.org/our-priorities, 
cited 20 May 2014 
level agreement with UKSA whereby they 
are the main delivery partner for 
telecommunications and navigation 
programmes, including those run by ESA. 
This includes sending national delegates 
to steering boards of both these 
programmes.
xx
 The TSB also directly fund 
R&D activities through their own funding 
mechanisms and have funded, in 
collaboration with UKSA and the SAC, the 
development of the technology 
demonstration platform TechDemoSat-1, 
due for launch in July 2014. 
The SAC is one of seven catapult centres, 
independent innovation and technology 
not-for-profit companies establish by the 
TSB and tasked with helping to drive 
future economic growth. The SAC is 
focused on the application and 
exploitation of space derived data and 
services, and is hence predominantly in 
the downstream sector. However, the 
SAC may also act in the upstream sector 
where it will lead to new, exploitable 
space derived data and/or services. The 
SAC funds three centres of excellence, 
one of which is located in Scotland, at 
the University of Strathclyde, and focuses 
on launching commercial opportunities 
in energy, future cities and other key 
growth sectors. 
The Ministry of Defence (MOD), along 
with the security services, are active in 
the space sector; using space-based 
 
xx
 See 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/ukspaceagency/doc
s/service-level-
agreement/technologystrategyboardsla2011marc
h.pdf, cited 27 June 2014 
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assets for communication and 
surveillance. Largely, the MOD procures 
suitable communication capabilities 
from the private sector. The UK does not 
publically acknowledge having 
domestic operational access to military 
surveillance spacecraft; instead 
accessing such data through 
international alliances. 
A final important aspect of any sector is 
the collective of organisations that assist 
the government in policy formation and 
business case development through 
documents such as the Space 
Innovation Growth Strategy action plan [1], 
and by providing evidence to 
parliamentary enquiries. Within the UK 
there exists a highly active network of 
such organisations, include trade 
associations, such as UKspace, ADS 
(Aerospace, Defence, Security and 
Space), and tech
UK
, and professional 
bodies such as the Royal Aeronautical 
Society, the Royal Astronomical Society 
and the Institute of Physics, amongst 
others. There are also organisations such 
as the Satellite Finance Network, which 
provide advice and support to industry, 
and the Parliamentary Space 
Committee, a cross-party group in the UK 
parliament providing a conduit between 
politicians and space professionals. 
3.3. The Scottish Space Sector 
Official public reports do not provide a 
detailed breakdown of the size, health 
and funding profiles of the UK space 
sector below the national level, hence 
accurate and referenceable 
quantification of the size of the Scottish 
space sector has not been possible 
within the scope of this analysis. However, 
in 2013 Scottish Enterprise commissioned 
an assessment of the size and health of 
the Scottish space sector with a view to 
informing internal strategy towards 
supporting the sector. The detailed 
methodology and findings of this survey 
are not publically available and hence it 
is not known whether, for example, the 
standard space sector definition was 
used. However, some headline results 
are known. The Scottish Space sector 
was found to comprise 32 companies 
including established suppliers, early 
phase start-up's and firms diversifying 
from core aerospace and defence 
activities, with combined company sales 
for 2012 of £12.5 million. Combined 
industrial and academic space activity 
contributed over £35 million to the 
Scottish economy in 2012. 
The Scottish space sector has thus, by 
any measure, a significantly smaller 
commercial value than that of the UK. 
However, the level of importance placed 
on the growing Scottish sector by the UK 
is evident in the recently launched 
Satellite Applications Catapult Scottish 
Centre of Excellence at the University of 
Strathclyde, together with the UK 
Astronomy Technology Centre in 
Edinburgh. A further example is UKube-1, 
built by Clyde Space in Glasgow and 
due for launch in July 2014 as UKSA’s first 
spacecraft. The ability of the SAC Scottish 
Centre of Excellence to connect with 
other key sectors of the Scottish 
economy, such as the energy sector and 
the future cities demonstrator in Glasgow, 
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are seen by some as critical to the 
realisation of the Space Innovation 
Growth Strategy action plan as they offer 
significant new growth potential to the 
space sector. 
Furthermore, analysis of research papers 
in space science between January 1999 
and June 2009 by the Times Higher 
Education found that Scotland ranked 
top of the global league table for 
impact, ahead of Israel in second and 
Canada in third; USA were fifth and 
England was eighth.
xxi
 
4. The White Paper:  
Scotland’s Future 
The White Paper acknowledges a 
number of options exist for the funding of 
R&D but states a desire to “maintain a 
common research area with the rest of 
the UK including existing shared 
Research Councils.”[4] It also states an 
intention to negotiate “a fair funding 
formula for Scotland’s contribution based 
on population share”, and that this 
formula should also reflect the amount of 
funding received in iScotland may be 
higher or lower than a simple population 
share. The Scottish Government has also 
provided a “guarantee that current 
levels of government investment in 
university research (through SFC and the 
Research Councils) will be at least 
maintained and that there will be no 
 
xxi
 See 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/408577.arti
cle, cited 20 May 2014 
adverse funding impact from Scotland’s 
transition to independence” [8]. 
Also relevant to the space sector is 
question 449, which addresses the Met 
Office and states that the “Scottish 
Government will seek agreement with 
Westminster to maintain the provision of 
these services on independence. The 
Scottish Government will make an 
appropriate financial contribution for the 
use of these services.” Implied within this 
answer is thus a commitment to fund 
EUMETSAT via contributions to the Met 
Office. However, since EUMETSAT is an 
international satellite organisation with 
the UK as one of its member states, the 
exact form of collaboration with 
iScotland would require more 
detailed attention. 
The ‘Regulation of Outer Space’ is 
addressed within the White Paper in 
questions 105 and 106.  
105. Will Scotland continue to 
participate in international space 
agencies? 
Yes. Scotland will continue to work 
with the UK Space Agency and 
the European Space Agency. 
106. Will Scottish businesses be 
able to compete for contracts to 
the UK Space Agency? 
Yes. An independent Scotland will 
continue to be part of the 
European Union. In line with EU 
Public Procurement Law 
companies in Scotland will be 
able to compete for contracts to 
the UK Space Agency and the 
European Space Agency. 
  
9 
Question 105 commits iScotland to 
continued participation in the space 
sector but states nothing of the nature of 
the relationship envisaged with either 
UKSA or ESA. However, the essence of the 
White Paper is to continue co-operation 
with existing UK-wide bodies wherever 
possible. Hence, it could be deduced 
that, following the spirit of the White 
Paper, the intention may be that 
iScotland should ‘seek a fair funding 
relationship’ or ‘make appropriate 
financial contributions’ to UKSA and 
hence maintain membership of ESA via 
UKSA. This option will be considered in 
Section 5, together with the option of an 
independent and direct relationship with 
the international community. 
Question 106 is completely accurate with 
regard to UKSA, and indeed of other 
national agencies such as CNES and 
DLR,
xxii
 but does appear to misunderstand 
the relationship between the EU and ESA, 
and the fact that ESA is not subject to EU 
Public Procurement Law as it is a wholly 
separate entity managed by its own 
international treaties. While ESA is 
currently managing the development 
and contracting for the EU’s two major 
space programmes, Galileo GNSS and 
Copernicus (formerly Global Monitoring 
for Environment and Security, GMES), it 
operates under EU procurement law in 
terms of the EU/ESA Framework 
Agreement between both institutions that 
 
 
xxii
 CNES (Centre national d'études spatiales) is the 
French National Centre of Space Research and 
DLR (Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt) is 
the German Aerospace Centre. 
came into force in May 2004.
xxiii
  Other 
than within this special context, ESA 
contracts are not subject to EU law and 
its operations take place under its aegis 
as an international organisation that 
benefits from immunity. As a result, 
whereas space programmes subject to 
EU procurement are open to judicial 
review, the same does not apply to 
programmes and contract awards 
under ESA procurement rules. 
5. Impact of Scottish 
Independence 
It is always unwise to claim knowledge of 
the future: Consider that in 1876 Sir 
William Preece (1834 – 1913), Chief 
Engineer of the General Post Office, the 
forerunner to BT, is attributed to have said 
“The Americans have need of the 
telephone, but we do not. We have 
plenty of messenger boys.”  
Within this section, the possible impact 
of Scottish independence will be 
considered and the primary issues that 
will need to be considered highlighted. 
5.1. European Commission 
Funding is awarded on a competitive 
basis. Hence, Scottish independence is 
unlikely to have any net, direct impact on 
the ability of organisations within 
iScotland to win such funding. Indeed, 
 
xxiii
 OJ L 261, 6.8.2004, p.64. Discussions are currently 
underway about the options for continued 
collaboration in the future, see Commission Progress 
report on establishing appropriate relations 
between the European Union and the European 
Space Agency (ESA), COM (2014) 56 final. 
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the requirement within most of the 
Commission’s programmes for proposals 
to have organisations from three different 
member states may make it easier for 
Scottish and rest-of-UK (rUK) organisations 
to win funding, as they would now 
represent two different member states. In 
a similar vein, the presence of dedicated 
Scottish representation in the discussions 
that inform the Commission’s 
programmes would enable iScotland’s 
priorities to be directly considered. 
However, this will be as a smaller 
member state, requiring the 
development of more alliances and 
trades with other members than as part 
of the UK, where such trades happen 
before these negotiations; that is, at the 
national level. On balance, it is likely that 
independence will have little direct, net 
impact on European Commission 
funding as related to the Scottish 
space sector. 
5.2. EUMETSAT 
As stated in Section 4, implied within the 
answer to question 449 of the White 
Paper Scotland’s Future, is a commitment 
to fund EUMETSAT via contributions to the 
Met Office. In practice, a Scottish 
contribution to the UK funding 
presupposes that the EUMETSAT Council 
accepts the co-funding model proposed 
by what is effectively a separate, albeit 
small, state, and that issues around 
Scottish representation at the EUMETSAT 
ruling council could be resolved in such 
a scenario. In principle, it is open for 
iScotland to notify its decision to join 
EUMETSAT under Article 16(3) 
Convention, which would require a 
Council decision on its admission. 
The same considerations apply as to 
any new independent state joining 
an international organisation; there must 
be full agreement by existing member 
states and the criteria for admission must 
be met. It is less the criteria of statehood 
that are in question here, rather the issue 
of co-funding. Although a discussion 
is underway about the exact legal 
basis to ensure iScotland’s continuing 
membership of the EU after 
independence, the EUMETSAT 
Convention does not contain provisions 
equivalent to Articles 48 and 49 in the 
Treaty on the European Union; which 
claims a specific form of supranational 
character that distinguishes it from other 
international organisations. Be that as it 
may, Article 5(2)(a) EUMETSAT enables 
the Council to set the terms and 
conditions of state membership, so that 
where agreement with rUK is reached, 
then the unanimity requirement of 
Council members could be met.  
5.3. European Space Agency 
As previously noted ESA is entirely 
separate to the European Union and as 
such is not subject to EU Public 
Procurement Law. Indeed, a 
fundamental cornerstone of ESA is the 
concept of ‘fair return’ or ‘geo-return’; 
termed juste retour by the EU. The main 
rule adopted by ESA since March 1997 is 
that “the ratio between the share of a 
country in the weighted value of 
contracts, and its share in the 
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contribution paid to the Agency, must be 
of X per cent (e.g 0.98%) by the end of a 
given period.”
xxiv
 If a member state is 
under-returned special measures can be 
taken to rectify this situation, however it 
should be noted that awarded contracts 
must be judged of sufficient quality at the 
assessment stage to ensure quality and 
economy. Hence, member states without 
a sufficiently sized or skilled space sector 
can suffer from prolonged periods of 
under-return while such structural issues 
are resolved. 
Member states subscribe to the 
optional programmes that align with 
their national interests. For example, 
the UK is the largest contributor to the 
Telecommunications & Integrated 
Applications programme as this aligns 
very well with the UKs stated strategic 
priorities. Being a large contributor to a 
programme gives a member a 
considerable influence within that 
programme. Although in reality iScotland 
may choose to subscribe to separate 
activities, for the purpose of this analysis it 
will be assumed that iScotland would 
contribute at the same pro rata level as 
the UK currently does, and that a geo-
return of 85 – 95% is achieved.  
Considering the figures from 2012/13 to 
enable comparison with the defined 
Scottish space sector in Section 3.3, the 
‘Scottish ESA subscription’ was £18.2 
million (see Section 3.1), giving a geo-
 
xxiv
 See 
http://www.esa.int/About_Us/Industry/Industry_how
_to_do_business/Industrial_policy_and_geographi
cal_distribution, cited 20 May 2014 
return of £15.5 – 17.3 million. Neither 
ESA nor UKSA track geo-return at the 
level below member state, hence this 
due level of geo-return to Scotland 
cannot be readily compared against 
the actual level achieved.  
Employment in the space sector 
predominantly breaks down as 55% in 
Greater London, 24% in the South East, 
and 12% in the Eastern region, with the 
South West and East Midlands together 
taking 8% of the employment [2]. 
Therefore, Scotland, Wales, Northern 
Ireland and all other regions of England 
account for around 1% of the sectors 
employment. Assuming all of these jobs 
are in Scotland and that Scottish 
organisations perform as well as rUK 
companies in attaining ESA contracts it 
can be surmised that ESA contracts in 
2012 were of the order £2 – 3 million, and 
were highly likely less than £5 million. 
Thus, it is likely that iScotland would 
have been under-returned by the 
order of £10 – 15 million.
xxv
  
Noting that the Scottish ‘ESA subscription’ 
will increase to an average of £23 million 
each year, as previously detailed in 
Section 3.1, it could therefore be 
suggested that independence would be 
worth £15 – 20 million per year to the 
Scottish space sector in ESA 
contracts alone. 
 
xxv
 An informal, unscientific survey of the Scottish 
space sector suggests ESA contracts in Scotland 
2012 were likely below the lower bound of the 
estimated range, and hence the level of under-
return is likely underestimated. 
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Any net gain in ESA contracts resulting 
from the policy of geo-return must be 
considered in light of iScotland being 
a significantly smaller and hence less 
influential member of ESA. In addition, 
small nations in ESA often subscribe to 
optional programmes well below GDP 
proportion, although some countries 
like Belgium are exceptions to this, with 
many focused on as direct as possible 
an industrial return. In some small 
member states, funding can appear 
focused on rapid returns with little 
interest for novel research, which can 
include the science programme. Such 
members can also have a strong focus 
on direct industrial return and in 
spinning off results of ESA contracts to 
other areas. Meaning once a company 
has developed a proven capability, 
often the member state can be 
unhappy to reuse them, as it will not 
develop new capacity. 
iScotland would need to make an 
assessment as to the value of ESA 
membership and to which optional 
programmes it would most benefit, 
ensure it learned appropriate lessons 
from other small member states and 
fully exploit all of the mechanism that 
exist within ESA to help new and 
emerging nations. 
5.4. The Legal Framework 
The White Paper commits iScotland to 
the international treaties to which the 
UK is already a signatory. Therefore, 
iScotland would become a signatory to 
all five relevant UN space treaties, and, 
as a Member of the United Nations, 
subscribe to the ‘post-Cold War treaties 
alongside the subsequent generation of 
so-called ‘soft law’, non-binding legal 
rules that also contribute to the 
governance of space activities. These 
rules, some being General Assembly 
Resolutions, others Guidelines, are all 
designed to clarify and further the 
longer-term sustainability of space 
activities.
xxvi
 The UN space treaties lay 
down the principles and specific duties 
alongside the responsibilities on ‘space-
faring nations’ in relation to their 
governmental and non-governmental, or 
commercial, space activities. This 
international level of regulation is 
important for the control of activities as 
spacecraft can be launched in a foreign 
commercial market. Scotland is involved 
in developing nano-spacecraft, 
launched out of foreign states, as well 
as other satellite-based technologies. 
Scotland may even have potential as a 
commercial launch site, all of which 
requires the government to ensure 
licensing, and consideration of risk 
allocation, normally towards the private 
sector, as well as indemnity insurance 
requirements to avoid automatically or 
unwittingly accepting these vicariously. 
The main principles governing the 
peaceful use of outer space are laid 
down in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 
thereafter expanded in the 1968 Rescue 
Agreement, the 1972 Liability Convention 
 
xxvi
 See e.g. unedited transcript, UN COPUOS, Legal 
Subcommittee, March 2011,  
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/transcripts/legal/LEGA
L_T827E.pdf, cited 24 June 2014 
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and the 1975 Registration Convention. 
The 1979 Moon Agreement, to which  
the UK and only a minority of the 
international state community have 
subscribed, reiterates the tenor of the 
original four treaties, but leaves scope  
for the elaboration of a future regime  
for extracting the Moon’s natural 
substances. Because of the low level  
of ratifications, the status of the Moon 
Agreement remains disputed. 
Currently, there appears no justification 
to depart from Scotland’s current position 
in relation to the above international 
treaty and the accompanying ‘soft law’ 
obligations. Article VI of the Outer Space 
Treaty provides for governmental 
authorisation and ‘continuing supervision’ 
of all types of national space activities, 
be these scientific, governmental or 
commercial. Licensing mechanisms are 
provided for at the national level. The 
definition of space activities includes 
operations involving space data, an 
important aspect of all space activities 
because of the impact on downstream 
markets, which are a key and emerging 
part of the Scottish space sector.  
As previously mentioned, there is a 
noticeable increase in the number of 
dedicated national space laws 
appearing on the statute books of 
various ‘new’ small space jurisdictions; 
these are countries that are witnessing  
a growth in the nano-spacecraft sector, 
much of which stems from work coming 
out of research institutes and universities. 
Note that UKube-1, UKSA’s first spacecraft, 
is a CubeSat built by Clyde Space in 
Glasgow, and that UKube-1 emerged 
from a Knowledge Transfer Partnership 
between Clyde Space and the University 
of Strathclyde. As such, iScotland could 
find itself very much at the forefront of 
these ‘new’ small space jurisdictions. 
Dedicated space legislation is not 
essential for licensing regimes, some 
states that are active in outer space, that 
is who build and operate spacecraft but 
that are not launching states, such as 
Germany who procure the launch 
service from another nation, do not have 
dedicated legislation. In such cases, 
these states may prefer to focus on 
regulating access to and the use of high-
resolution data.
xxvii
 However, some 
important considerations are worth 
highlighting; firstly, a national space 
statute provides legal certainty in the 
case of international state-to-state liability 
for commercial space activities where 
there is clear physical, tangible, 
economic damage. More importantly,  
it provides a legal basis for governments 
to claim indemnification from the 
commercial sector when their launching 
state liability is called on. This point is 
further expanded below in relation to 
the OSA. 
Whether by Order in Council or through 
a delegation agreement equivalent to 
that bridging the competence gap 
between the EU and ESA, the respective 
competences between a rUK and an 
independent Scottish government’s 
 
xxvii
 See the Satellitendatensicherheitsgesetz, SatDSiG 
(Satellite Data Security Act); http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/satdsig/ cited 24 June 2014 
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regulatory authority should be  
clearly delineated.   
UK space licenses are awarded by the 
Secretary of State on the basis of the OSA 
(see Section 3.2, above). This extends to 
compliance with the international debris 
mitigation guidelines that have become 
an important standard over the past 
decade. The OSA 1986 currently includes 
Scotland as well as the Isle of Man and 
Channel Islands within its scope. The Isle 
of Man in particular has developed into 
a commercial space jurisdiction, with the 
backing of the UK government in the 
case of any international liability claims. 
iScotland would require to negotiate the 
terms of any continued relationship with 
rUK, not only in relation to licensing by the 
rUK Secretary of State but also in relation 
to the issue of United Kingdom nationality 
(section 2(1) OSA).  
The OSA regulates space activities 
undertaken by United Kingdom 
nationals. Nationality currently falls within 
the reserved powers under the Scotland 
Act 1998.
xxviii
 Post-independence, the 
scope of UK nationality, as opposed to 
citizenship, would require clarification in 
the context of space and the on-going 
relationship with UKSA. There are further 
implications for the UK Register of Space 
Objects, and not least, space companies 
incorporated in iScotland.  
Article VII of the OST and the Liability 
Convention addresses a further aspect 
of space activities in Scotland, beyond its 
 
xxviii
 Scotland Act 1998, c. Schedule 5, B6 
capabilities in the development and 
procurement of spacecraft and their 
components. As part of the UK 
governments response to the Space 
Innovation Growth Strategy action plan 
[1], they set up a cross departmental 
‘National Space Flight Coordination 
Group’ to develop the necessary legal 
framework to permit a spaceport to be 
established in the UK and to aid the 
selection of its site [9]. UKSA, through its 
Space Collaborative Innovation Team 
Initiative (Space CITI) pilot programme,  
is also funding the UKLaunch consortium 
to study the technical and economic 
feasibility of a UK-based small satellite 
launcher. Whilst a number of possible 
launch sites can be considered, and 
none have yet been shortlisted, many of 
the most promising ones are in Scotland. 
This is due to issues of population density, 
existing infrastructure and the ability to 
integrate with existing air-traffic without 
significant disruption. The UK government 
acknowledged “that this is an important 
area of work which has the potential to 
provide a valuable addition to the UK 
space ecosystem, in the longer term 
potentially leading to more reliable, 
affordable launch services and new 
local and regional growth opportunities 
for space business” [9]. It would therefore 
seem logical to presume that the space 
sector in iScotland may wish to continue 
to pursue this opportunity. The 
government of iScotland should 
therefore seek to ensure that no 
impediment to the development of a 
domestic launch facility existed, or that 
could hold back export or launch of 
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Scottish designed, manufactured or 
integrated technology. 
Article VII of the OST and the Liability 
Convention impose international state 
liability of a launching state for third party 
damage caused by a space object to 
the property and nationals of other 
states. The growth of nano-spacecraft 
procurement paves the way for ‘small’ 
space jurisdictions in particular to 
constitute launching states. This in turn 
may result in government liability for 
public and private commercial space 
activities, as was mentioned previously. 
The four categories of launching state in 
the Liability Convention, as repeated in 
the Registration Convention, are 
designed to ensure that any damage 
caused by a space object can be met 
by at least one liable launching state, 
whether or not on the basis of joint and 
several liability. The outer space liability 
regime is structured on the concept of 
solvent states, with reliable budgets 
presumed, to ensure a victim-orientated 
approach to secure compensation [10]. 
The driver for national space legislation is 
therefore primarily to impose a duty on 
commercial operators (generally insured 
up to a ceiling) to indemnify the 
government of the launching state 
for third party damage, as well as to 
regulate licensing and appropriate in-
orbit insurance coverage. This is all the 
more important since the launch of 
nano-spacecraft is generally brokered 
through a foreign state. A state other 
than that of the ‘home’ nationality is often 
involved in the launch and with this, 
jointly and severally liable with the 
procuring state for launching activities. 
iScotland would be required to manage 
the fine distinction between the 
requirements of Article VI of the Outer 
Space Treaty and the requirements of 
Article V of the Liability Convention 
through appropriate bilateral 
agreements [10,11]. 
In determining launching state liability, 
criteria for determining liability being 
procuring, financing, or launching from 
own territory or platform, another can 
be the entry of a satellite or space 
object on a state’s Register of Space 
Objects, held at national level and by 
the UN. Various launching states 
conveniently include the nationality of 
a foreign spacecraft on their national 
register in order to help clarify that the 
satellites are not nationally procured. 
iScotland would be required to 
consider whether any continued 
collaboration with UKSA should be 
more formalised, with the key bi-lateral 
markers for assumption of liability 
mapped out.  
Independent of the launching state 
liability, foreign commercial launching 
states (such as India or Russia) acquire 
shared responsibilities in their role as 
‘appropriate state’ under Article VI of 
the OST. Their status as launching state 
for foreign spacecraft is clear. The joint 
and several nature of international 
liability for spacecraft, under the 
Liability Convention make it all the 
more essential to ensure national 
legislation and international 
agreements between iScotland and,  
if so be, then rUK on apportionment.  
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One further technology, the status of 
which has not been finally determined 
within international space law, at least 
in relation to liability, is the so-called 
GNSS signal in space. Despite the 
absence of a clear definition of a 
signal in space, the current initiative  
to introduce a convention regulating 
third party liability from GNSS signals 
should be monitored.
xxix
 
Of the two regulatory regimes that exist 
for space activities at international level, 
the first is, as discussed, compliance with 
the international UN treaty law governing 
outer space. The second is adherence 
and compliance with the Radio and 
Frequency Spectrum management 
regime governed by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), a 
specialised agency of the UN. The ITU 
orbit allocation and frequency 
assignment system confers a right on its 
signatory states to use the spectrum on 
the basis of international allocations, 
leaving it to national regulatory 
authorities to award licenses for the 
diverse uses of the spectrum that exist. 
Here too, iScotland would require 
clarification of the competent regulatory 
agency and agreement as to whether 
OFCOM should act – as with UKSA – 
within a bilateral delegation agreement. 
iScotland would need to ensure that 
the administrative requirements for 
frequency notifications be made at 
 
xxix
 UNIDROIT, LXXIX Third Party Liability for GNSS, 
http://www.unidroit.org/work-in-progress-
studies/studies/civil-liability/393-study-lxxix-third-
party-liability-for-global-navigation-satellite-system-
gnss-services, cited 23 June 2014 
national and international level. Note 
that the White Paper, in Question 101, 
states that these powers will “transfer to 
the Scottish Parliament as a result  
of independence”; hence licensing 
and ITU registration will be an obligation 
of the iScotland government. 
As indicated, although not all states have 
a national space law, Article VI of the 
OST nevertheless requires states to 
authorise and supervise space activities 
undertaken by their private entities on a 
case-by-case basis. Many countries, 
including those of similar size to iScotland 
such as Belgium, Estonia and Austria, 
have developed national space law in 
response to this international obligation. 
France is the only European country 
currently to have integrated its technical 
requirements relating to sustainability 
and debris mitigation into substantive 
national law. 
5.5. UK Space Agency, the Research 
Councils, and R&D Investment 
As discussed in Section 4, the envisaged 
relationship with UKSA in the White Paper 
is unclear. If the intention is for iScotland 
to ‘seek a fair funding relationship’  
or ‘make appropriate financial 
contributions’ to UKSA, and hence to 
maintain membership of ESA via UKSA, 
then many of the previously identified 
benefits of independence are negated 
and the discussed legal issues become 
prominent. However, this would also 
mean that iScotland would in effect be 
subsidising the rUK space sector to the 
value of £15 – 20 million per year in ESA 
subscriptions alone. 
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The answer to question 106 of the White 
Paper states that “companies in Scotland 
will be able to compete for contracts to 
the UK Space Agency”. As stated in 
Section 4, this is completely accurate. 
However, the UK Space Agency typically 
does not issue contracts, rather issuing 
grants, which are not subject to VAT or to 
European Union rules on public 
procurement. The UK Space Agency 
‘Annual Report and Accounts 2012-13’ 
show that they issued just over £40 million 
of grants in the reporting period [3].  
Should iScotland ‘seek a fair funding 
relationship’ or ‘make appropriate 
financial contributions’ to UKSA then 
there is no reason why such grants could 
not be issued to Scottish organisations as 
well as those in rUK. However, if no formal 
arrangement were in place then Scottish 
organisations would lose access to these 
grants and a Scottish equivalent would 
be required. 
In a similar nature to the relationship with 
UKSA, the research councils would need 
to be formalised. Assuming a funding 
relationship was achieved that both 
sides deemed fair then the approach 
outlined in the White Paper is likely to be 
viable; however, no assessment or 
judgement is offered as to its desirability 
from either an independent Scottish or 
rUK perspective. Furthermore, issues such 
as the ‘dual key’ mechanisms, operated 
by NERC & STFC with UKSA, would require 
careful consideration as it is possible 
Scottish and rUK priorities may differ. In 
addition, iScotland may decide not to 
have a formal relationship with UKSA 
due to the above noted issues on ESA 
membership, which would further 
complicate such a relationship.  
The issue of research funding has 
become contentious within the 
campaign; however, it has rather 
narrowly focused on the higher 
education sector. As the upstream  
space sector is R&D intensive, some of 
the facts will be briefly considered. Within 
the White Paper the Scottish Government 
acknowledge the quality of the Scottish 
higher education institutions by noting 
that in 2012/13 these institutions secured 
13.1% of UK research council funding 
awarded on a competitive basis [8]. The 
Scottish Government also say, “over the 
three years, 2010/11 to 2012/13, Scotland 
secured 10.6% of total Research Council 
spend while contributing 9.4% of UK tax 
receipts” and hence that “there is limited 
difference” between Scotland’s current 
contribution and what it gets back [8]. 
Countering this, the Better Together 
campaign contend that “no fair Scottish 
science budget” could maintain current 
levels of investment,
xxx
 and that to do so 
would require an increase in research 
spend equivalent to 0.23% of Scotland’s 
2012 GDP [12].
xxxi
  
Research funding and R&D spend go to 
the core of a nation’s level of technical 
innovation and its international 
 
xxx
 See 
http://bettertogether.net/blog/entry/perhaps-the-
best-place-on-earth-to-carry-out-scientific-research, 
cited 01 June 2014. 
xxxi
 Based on an analysis of Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) number (see xxxv) this GDP 
percentage is taken as a population pro rate; a 
GDP pro rata would be 0.19%. 
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competitiveness, something both the UK 
and Scottish government are already 
committed to improving in the pursuit of 
a ‘more balanced economy’, and 
hence should be viewed within the 
European and international context.  
Within Europe, a goal of each member 
spending 3% of GDP on R&D by 2020 
has been agreed.
xxxii
 The UK 
government’s Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) show that the UK spent 
1.72% of GDP on R&D in 2012, of which 
63% (1.1% of GDP) was from business. 
The UK’s level of Growth Expenditure 
on R&D (GERD) has oscillated around 
this value since 1997 when a decade 
long downward trend from a high of 
2.14% in 1986 concluded.
xxxiii
 The UK-
wide level of GERD is below the 2004 
target set by the UK government for 
2014 of 2.5% GDP,
xxxiv
 and below the 
estimated 2.06% EU-average in 2012.
xxxiii
 
The ONS show that GERD in Scotland 
was 1.3% of GDP in 2012,
xxxv
 of which 37% 
(0.47% of GDP) was from business; in 
 
xxxii
 The target measures investment by business, 
higher education, government and private non-
profits (i.e. charities), and is collectively known as 
growth expenditure on R&D (GERD); see 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-
nutshell/targets/index_en.htm, cited 01 June 2014. 
xxxiii
 See http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/rdit1/gross-
domestic-expenditure-on-research-and-
development/2012/stb-gerd-2012.html,  
cited 01 June 2014. 
xxxiv
 See 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/
/www.berr.gov.uk/dius/science/science-
funding/framework/page9306.html,  
cited 01 June 2014. 
xxxv
 See http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/rdit1/gross-
domestic-expenditure-on-research-and-
development/2012/rft-gerd-regional-2012.xls,  
cited 03 June2014. 
Israel, this figure is closer to 80%. A level of 
business R&D expenditure below 1% of 
GDP is a cause for significant concern 
within the European context [13].  
It is evident that discussion of research 
spending should be more than simply 
government funding and that the total 
UK research spend is lower than many 
other similar Western European 
economies, with that total still lower in 
Scotland. UK GERD has remained low for 
the last 15 years and the low level of 
GERD in Scotland, along with an 
overreliance on government funding for 
this R&D is a cause for significant 
concern. This highlights a structural issue 
within the Scottish economy that should 
be addressed no matter the outcome of 
the referendum in September. With 
regard to this, it has even be argued that 
a cut in government funded R&D could 
be a positive step for Scotland as it would 
better encourage domestic private 
venture capital to engage with early-
stage start-ups [12]. In relation to the 
space sector, however, it could also 
be argued that this is perhaps more 
applicable to the downstream data-
exploitation sector than the upstream 
due to the return on investment 
timescales and level of risk involved 
in upstream.  
5.6. The Technology Strategy Board 
The White paper does not address the 
relationship with the TSB or the catapult 
centres beyond the generic comments 
around seeking “a common research 
area with the rest of the UK”. As the TSB 
operates at arm’s length from the 
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government as a public body, 
reporting to BIS, it would appear 
feasible that iScotland could develop 
a similar relationship should it, and rUK, 
desire, and agree. However, as with 
other similar scenarios the value of 
such an approach would need to be 
carefully traded against a dedicated 
Scottish body. 
5.7. Satellite Applications Catapult 
Considerations of issues around the SAC 
are slightly different as the catapult 
centres are independent not-for-profit 
companies; as such, they are not a grant 
awarding body, instead placing 
contracts. Thus, it could be argued that 
iScotland may expect to gain a pro rata 
share in the ownership of these 
companies whilst taking on a similar 
share of any outstanding funding 
commitments; the pro rata adopted 
would be a matter of negotiation. 
However, it is also possible that a barter 
agreement is sought over facilities, 
whereby for example certain facilities  
in iScotland are traded against other 
facilities in rUK rather than simply dividing 
ownership of everything on the agreed 
pro rata basis. This is an important 
consideration as it may influence the 
level of access that researchers based in 
iScotland would have to facilities in rUK, 
whilst also likely setting a precedent for 
any future investments. 
5.8. Impact on the Rest of the UK 
The consequences of Scottish 
independence for the rUK space sector 
would likely be rather minimal; however, 
whilst much of the impact is dependent 
on the post-independence relationship 
between the two parties it would most 
likely not pass without consequence.  
For example, if iScotland were to 
become a separate member state of 
ESA rather than, for example, through 
a delegation agreement with UKSA 
then the loss of iScotland’s 9.6% 
contribution towards GDP would be 
disproportionately felt by the rUK space 
sector. Currently very little of the space 
investment returns to Scotland, hence, 
for a flat-funding profile rUK would 
need to increase spending on space 
as a percentage of GDP. It is likely that 
the business case for this increase 
could be made, and recent actions 
suggest the rUK government would be 
responsive to this business case. 
The noted potential of a domestic 
spaceport “to provide a valuable 
addition to the UK space ecosystem” 
could also be impacted by Scottish 
independence. However, as potential 
launch sites exist outside Scotland 
these areas could gain from Scottish 
independence if iScotland did not 
pursue the opportunity with the same 
vigour as rUK. 
5.9. Impact of Delayed Membership 
The white paper asserts that Scotland, 
following a Yes vote, would be 
independent by 24 March 2016 [4]. It  
is not the role of this analysis to appraise 
to validity of that statement; however, a 
core assumption has been that iScotland 
is a member of international 
organisations such as the EU and ESA. 
Given the discussion in the preceding 
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sections, this is recognised as a 
considerable assumption to which the 
impact of independence on the space 
sector would have a sizable sensitivity. 
To quantify the effect of not becoming a 
member, or a delay in membership of 
international organisations such as the EU 
and ESA in monetary terms is immensely 
difficult. However, the effects can be 
summarised: a reduction in research 
funding to industry and academia, a 
disruption in research and other 
networks, and a reduction in commercial 
contracts for industry. Lack of ESA and 
EUMETSAT membership would also 
result in a loss of access to some 
space-derived data products. Any 
disruption or lack of access to 
international organisations, including 
the EU, could therefore be a potentially 
significant problem. 
The Scottish governments “guarantee” 
over university research funding suggests 
that a delay, or absence of a continuing 
relationship with the Research Councils 
should not have a significant financial 
impact on university research [8]. 
However, it is notable that this guarantee 
does not extend to, for example, the TSB; 
who predominantly fund industrial R&D. 
6. Transition to Independence 
As previously stated, ESA is operated 
through intergovernmental treaties that 
commit member states to a defined 
level of funding. The UK therefore has 
existing funding commitments to ESA 
that run well beyond 24 March 2016, 
the envisaged date of Scottish 
independence. Two options exist as  
to how these may be divided. The rUK 
may decide to take on the full funding 
commitment to all international bodies 
and refuse any discussion of a 
delegation agreement between 
iScotland and UKSA. In this case, the 
Scottish space sector would become 
independent on the proposed date of 
24 March 2016 and iScotland will be 
required to ensure continuity of 
membership to avoid any adverse 
effects of discontinuity. Alternatively, 
the two governments may agree a 
short-term delegation agreement or 
similar to allow iScotland to contribute 
to these existing multi-year international 
funding commitments. Such an 
agreement could even form the basis 
for a longer-term relationship. In such a 
case, and given the accepted 
principle of ‘fair return’ or ‘geo-return’ 
within ESA, iScotland could argue that 
it will contribute on the basis of 
contracts placed in iScotland by ESA, 
whilst the rUK would likely desire 
iScotland to contribute on a GDP pro 
rata basis at 9.6%. 
The financial arrangement 
accompanying iScotland’s transition 
depends on the successor arrangements 
to the Scotland Act 1998, as amended in 
2012. Space has a dual nature of civil 
and defence, certain issues are currently 
reserved to Westminster under the 
devolved legislation.  A transition period 
is required, for not only acceptance by 
the international governmental and 
satellite organisations, notably ESA and 
EUMETSAT, but also the ITU. Any disruption 
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or lack of access to international 
organisations, including the EU, could be 
a significant problem; hence, during the 
period between a Yes vote and 24 
March 2016 the Scottish government 
would need to ensure contingency plans 
to address any possible discontinuity in 
membership. In a similar vein, the Scottish 
government would need to develop a 
clear approach to ensuring continuity of 
R&D funding currently distributed from 
bodies such as the Research Councils 
and the TSB in the event that, for 
example, the timescale outlined were  
to prove problematic in reaching a 
sufficient conclusion. 
Funding contributions to international 
organisations is crucial. While trades 
between the rUK, iScotland and the 
international community should be 
approached pragmatically, post-
independence Scotland will require 
considering issues such as definitions 
of nationality vis-á-vis the rUK, and the 
concept of national for the purposes of 
licensing space activities. Discrimination 
on the basis of nationality is not permitted 
under EU law, which is why France grants 
equal treatment to liability for all EU 
launches. The space community has 
grown in numbers and scope, but there 
have been little changes to the rules. 
These include international liability, 
government indemnification in the event 
of third party liability, and the capability 
to continue in space-related R&D. 
 
 
7. The Case for Investment 
Advanced technological nations – and 
collectives of nations – largely invest in 
space in order to gain access to data, 
such as weather and climate data, or to 
provide services that are of benefit 
to citizens and their government. 
Investment is also undertaken in 
support of commercial enterprises 
and to stimulate technical innovation 
more broadly. Whilst national pride 
and geopolitics have historically 
been a contributor to the case  
for space funding, within Western 
Europe it is now very much the 
exception, beyond perhaps the 
Human Spaceflight Programme. 
Space investment is today largely based 
on pragmatism and business cases to 
meet specific national needs. For a 
nation such as iScotland, these include 
the requirements for communications at 
sea and resource mapping, along with 
services for many government 
departments; a recent report by the 
Norwegian government gives details  
of how they have achieved this through 
participation in ESA and EU programmes 
as well as bilateral programmes with 
other countries [14]. 
The multiplier value of space investment 
was specifically identified in a 2012 
report undertaken by PWC, which 
concluded that investment in ESA 
programmes generated additional sales 
of around 4 times the amount invested 
[15]. Of note, for a UK investment in ESA 
of £190 million in 2012-13, the UK 
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upstream sector had a turnover of order 
£980 million, a multiplier of five. 
8. Discussion 
iScotland would be required to consider 
two levels of interaction in continuing its 
current commitment to civil space. The 
first level is how it transitions its 
membership of international government 
organisations, such as ESA, to that of an 
independent member state, and what, if 
any, formal relationship it wished to have 
with UKSA. 
Predicting the potential size and scale of 
a future Scottish space sector, as part of 
the UK or as an independent nation is as 
perilous as predicting any aspect of the 
future. That Scottish independence could 
be said to be worth £15 – 20 million per 
year to the Scottish space sector in the 
near- to mid-term is notable. And that the 
long-term size and scale of that Scottish 
space sector may be of order £100 
million, or almost triple the current size 
based on a multiplier of four times ESA 
subscription [15], even more so. However, 
this is completely dependent on the 
relationship established between 
iScotland and rUK, and would appear to 
require a contravention of the spirit of the 
White Paper. Additionally, the ability of 
the Scottish space sector to secure this 
massively increased level of ESA funding 
in the near-term must be cautioned, 
while also noting that mechanisms 
do exist within ESA to help new and 
emerging nations in this regard. Indeed, 
given the strength and scale of the 
academic sector this, together with the 
existing experienced space operators 
who have previously secured funding 
from ESA for the development of cutting-
edge technologies and technology 
delivery contracts, could be encouraged 
to act as a catalyst to future commercial 
sector growth.  
The longer-term growth potential is also 
completely predicated on the ability of 
the Scottish space sector to gear ESA 
and national investment and to assist the 
Scottish government in correctly nurturing 
the sector to enable this growth. Currently 
within Scotland only a limited network of 
organisations exists that could assist the 
government in space policy formation 
and business case development; a new 
academic / industry forum would 
therefore likely be required. Of course, no 
magic formula exists to ensure this 
growth other than hard work and a 
highly skilled, motivated and innovative 
workforce. Whether this level of growth is 
possible within the current constitutional 
settlement is unclear, direct membership 
of ESA would be a significant aid but 
perhaps it is easier to note that 
independence would not bring an 
automatic boost to the sector. 
How iScotland would choose to maintain 
a formal relationship with UKSA is thus of 
vital importance as it has both economic 
and significant legal implications. 
While a formal link to the existing Outer 
Space Act 1986 under the notion of 
continuing validity of non-conflicting 
legislation sounds attractive at first sight, 
on a closer examination, it may only be 
feasible where the international state 
liability for space activities is clarified 
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between the Scottish and rUK 
governments. Scotland’s post-
independence treaty obligations cannot 
be passed onto a Minister of State of the 
rUK without a formal agreement on how 
each state’s respective liabilities are to 
be borne in principle. Specifically, 
respective functions of the Secretary of 
State for the rUK and iScotland would 
require further agreement about 
delegation of ministerial power, 
sovereign funds and rules on indemnity 
designed to cater for damage arising 
out of space activities. As regards 
membership of ESA and EUMETSAT, in 
particular, the existing member states  
are required to agree to accession by 
iScotland and to set the conditions;  
any disruption or lack of access to 
international organisations, including  
the EU, could be a potentially significant 
problem. Post-independence, the scope 
of UK nationality, as opposed to 
citizenship, would also require 
clarification in the context of space and 
the on-going relationship with UKSA. 
In addition, the relationship with 
EUMETSAT, and representation on its 
ruling Council, via co-funding 
contributions to the Met Office requires 
further thought but does appear in 
principle to be a viable option as, if 
agreement with the rUK is reached,  
then the unanimity requirement of 
Council members could also be met.  
The same judgement of ‘viable’ can be 
reached when considering the Scottish 
governments desire to “maintain a 
common research area with the rest of 
the UK”. However, whilst an approach 
may be viable, no assessment or 
judgement is offered as to its desirability 
from either a iScottish or rUK perspective. 
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11. Acronyms 
Acronym Meaning 
BIS Department for Business, Innovation & Skills
CNES Centre national d’études spatiales; the French 
National Centre of Space Research 
DLR Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt; the 
German Aerospace Centre 
EPSRC Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
ESA European Space Agency
EU European Union 
EUMETSAT European Organisation for the Exploitation 
of Meteorological Satellites 
GMES Global Monitoring for Environment and Security
GNP Gross National Product
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GERD Growth expenditure on R&D
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
iScotland Independent Scotland
ITU International Telecommunications Union
MOD Ministry of Defence
NERC Natural Environment Research Council
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
ONS Office for National Statistics
OSA Outer Space Act 
PECS Plan for European Cooperating States
SAC Satellite Applications Catapult
SFC Scottish Funding Council
STFC Science & Technology Facilities Council
TSB Technology Strategy Board
R&D Research & Development: defined in the UNESCO Statistical 
Yearbook 1980 as including fundamental and applied research, as 
well as experimental development. 
rUK Rest-of-UK 
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
UK-ATC UK Astronomy Technology Centre
UKSA UK Space Agency
UN United Nations 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
VAT Value Added Tax 
 
  

